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McCarthy, Andrew C. Willful Blindness: A Mem-
oir of the Jihad. New York: Encounter Books,
2008. 250pp. $25.95
For anyone who has followed, however
peripherally, the disposition of those
who have come to be called “detainees”
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Andrew McCarthy’s Willful Blindness is
a mandatory read. McCarthy was the
prosecuting U.S. attorney in the case of
the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdel
Rahman, for the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center. The book chroni-
cles McCarthy’s prosecutorial clean
sweep in that case, in which ten defen-
dants were convicted and the remaining
two pleaded guilty. McCarthy details
with great insight and clarity the con-
spiracy to bomb the World Trade Cen-
ter and the tortuous road of the
prosecutorial effort after the attack
—tortuous because the available law
enforcement and prosecutorial tools
were either antiquated or inadequate to
cope with the enormity and complexity
of the perpetrators’ efforts.
The United States has been grappling
for years with how to treat and process
those who have been captured and held
during the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Protocols of neither intelligence,
justice, nor the treatment of prisoners
have proved adequate to deal sensibly
and reliably with a diffuse yet tight-knit
group of adversaries.
The book begins with the chapter
“Imagine the Liability!” referring to a
concern of the FBI that an informant
placed in the inner circle of the conspir-
ators might materially contribute to the
success of the operation. Indeed, the
informant in this case worked his way
into the conspiracy only because of his
bomb-making skills. His FBI handlers
envisioned a very difficult legal battle if,
despite the warning provided by their
informant, the plot nevertheless suc-
ceeded. As a result, the informant was
extracted and hidden before the actual
target or timing of the effort had been
discovered. Through the efforts of their
informant, the FBI knew that some-
thing was afoot, but they did not know
precisely when or where, having
exfiltrated their undercover source be-
fore he could gain access to that critical
information.
Although this work reads much like a
novel, it offers clear examples of how
laws and procedures established for a
very different context can have severe
and unanticipated side effects.
As a single example of many mentioned
in the book, the process of discovery
during the preparation for trial can
cause to be divulged important infor-
mation that should be protected. As is
routine in such matters, in the course of
the pretrial workup a list of unindicted
coconspirators is developed. On such a
list, in 1994, was the name Osama Bin
Laden. Appropriately, under U.S. law,
the list was made available to defense
attorneys for the accused; it was subse-
quently leaked to Bin Laden, who was
in Kenya at the time. As McCarthy
writes, “Think, though, how valuable
[the fact] that [he was on the list]
would be for bin Laden to know. If you
are he, you say: ‘Maybe the government
has an informant in my inner circle.
Maybe I should use a different phone.
Maybe I should stop having meetings in
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Finally, this book is helpful for connect-
ing the dots after the fact, for reconsid-
ering how such adversaries think and
plan. For example, McCarthy points to
statements made three weeks prior to
the actual attack of the USS Cole in Oc-
tober 2000 by Sheikh Omar’s son, and
also to the writings of Nidal Ayyad, one
of those convicted in 1995 of the first
attack on the World Trade Center: “We
promise you that next time it will be
very precise and the World Trade Cen-
ter will continue to be one [of] our
targets.”
ROGER W. BARNETT, PROFESSOR EMERITUS
Naval War College
Casey, Steven. Selling the Korean War: Propa-
ganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950–1953.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008. 476pp. $55
The far left and the far right have some-
thing in common, especially when their
enemies hold the White House. They
each tend to think that the president
can get away with anything, because he
controls the media and the media con-
trols the public, especially when it
comes to issues of war. Professor Steven
Casey of the London School of Eco-
nomics actually knows something about
this topic, usually the realm of strong
opinions based on strong prejudice. In
2000 Casey wrote perhaps the most
perceptive study ever published on
presidential policy and public opinion
during World War II. His Cautious
Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ameri-
can Public Opinion, and the War against
Nazi Germany (2001) demonstrated
that FDR late in the war could not lead
the public to change its opinion that the
Nazi Party, not the German people, was
the primary culprit of German aggres-
sion. The president did not make this
distinction, but the country focused
blame on Hitler and his inner circle,
whom the Allies would remove from
power. They would not sanction the
plan of Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Morgenthau to dismantle German in-
dustry or to smash the German nation
into a bunch of separate principalities.
Why punish the people for the sins of
their deposed government?
Casey takes on President Harry S.
Truman under different, later circum-
stances. Truman wanted to “de-escalate,”
so to speak, public opinion lest it lead
to World War III versus China and the
Soviet Union. The president, in this ef-
fort, refused to call the Korean conflict
a “war,” as opposed to “a police ac-
tion,” his fateful phrase first uttered at a
press conference on 29 June 1950. This
signal to the American people did not
work out as the White House planned,
as Korea quickly turned out to be a war
by everyone’s definition—except that of
executive branch officials, who inadver-
tently freed the administration’s oppo-
nents from pressure to mute their
criticism, which is what the minority
usually does during a war lest it flirt
with disloyalty. “The administration’s
subdued public posture,” says Casey,
“often afforded the Republican opposi-
tion the perfect opportunity to take the
offensive.” Indeed, the public seemed
mystified about government policy, as
one State Department official pointed
out: “Those who approved our resis-
tance [to the communist invasion] in
Korea now find the present situation
completely confusing and baffling.”
A student of the Korean War can now
understand why the administration had
such difficulty containing Douglas
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